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ABSTRACT Key provisions of the Texas TANF waiver, 
Achieving Change for Texans (ACT), allowed the state to implement 
variable time limits, sanctions, and geographically-targeted work 
assistance programs. An innovative aspect of ACT was the 
provision that the state's variable time limits did not begin until a 
case was notified of an available slot in the job assistance program. 
Thus, state time limits were directly linked with the provision ofjob 
services while sanction penalties were applicable to the entire 
caseload. In this paper, we examine the time limit and sanction 
effects on the duration of cash assistance for all families that entered 
the caseload from January 1997 to September 1999. The findings 
suggest that nonrnetropolitan families are more likely to be 
sanctioned and have longer spell durations than metropolitan 
families. In both areas, the imposition of sanctions and state time 
limits increased the likelihood of exiting the caseload. 
When welfare reform legislation was enacted in 1996, opponents 
expressed concerns that a lack of employment opportunities would 
cause the most vulnerable families to exhaust their time limits without 
finding work, leaving them with neither employment nor cash 
assistance. In the post-reform period, however, it appears that sanctions 
have removed many families long before the expiration of their time 
limits (Goldberg and Schott 2000; Cherlin et al. 2001). This would 
suggest that, in the short run, sanctions rather than time limits present 
the greater potential threat to the safety net for vulnerable families. 
However, our understanding of how the various welfare reform rules 
are impacting the caseload is incomplete. Although time limits and 
sanctions aim at the same end result, they operate differently (Pavetti 
and Bloom 2000), and we know little about how time limits and 
sanctions might interplay to differentially affect particular groups or 
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places. 
Demographic, socioeconomic, and economic differences 
between urban and rural areas result in place-based differences in 
poverty (Rural Sociological Society Task Force 1993). Following 
welfare reform, these differences are particularly important for 
nonmetropolitan areas because the rural poor may face substantial 
problems in obtaining access to the economic opportunities necessary to 
rise from poverty and dependence and may lack access to the 
infrastructure and services necessary for successful transitions from 
welfare. For example, areas with lower population density tend to be 
more remote from urban centers and have higher costs for the provision 
of services, such as work training programs, than metropolitan areas 
(RUPRI 1999). 
In this article, we examine the use of sanctions and time limits 
in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program in 
Texas. Benefits reductions due to sanctions and time limits have been 
applied concurrently in the Texas TANF caseload, and this provides an 
opportunity to compare and contrast the use of these two enforcement 
tools across a broad range of recipient groups and geographic areas. 
The analysis examines the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan caseloads 
in Texas during the period from January 1997 to September 1999. This 
period coincides with the full implementation of the state's variable 
time limits and job assistance programs. The main questions address 
issues of locational differences in the application of sanctions and time 
limits within the state. 
Background 
Following years of bipartisan discontentment with the welfare system, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996. In a major 
philosophical shift, the legislation embraced the idea of an 
employment-based safety net as a viable alternative to the cash-based 
system that prevailed for some 60 years (Danziger 1998). Although 
work-oriented welfare has been tried in the past, earlier programs were 
characterized by numerous exemptions and generous definitions of 
employment activities. Not only are the work provisions of PRWORA 
applied more comprehensively than in earlier programs, the legislation 
also contains incentives aimed at enforcing the work rules. Among the 
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more important incentives are time limits on the receipt of cash 
assistance and sanctions for noncompliance with the rules of welfare 
reform. Time limits and sanctions aim to modifjl behaviors associated 
with welfare dependency by "raising the stakes" for welfare recipients 
because each creates a negative financial consequence for not following 
program requirements (Holcomb et al. 1998). 
When welfare reform was being discussed in the early 1990s, it 
was the time limit provision rather than sanctions that drew the most 
attention. Although sanctions in one form or another had long been 
used in the cash assistance program, time limits had never been applied 
to the public assistance program for families and children (Holcomb et 
al. 1998; Moffitt and Pavetti 1998; Swartz and Kaplan 1997). Not only 
are time limits novel, under PRWORA, there is no explicit linkage 
between time limits and work effort, and there are no provisions for 
those unable to find employment. Consequently, once time limits 
expire, there is no opportunity for a recipient to work in exchange for 
public assistance (Danziger 1998; Pavetti 1995). Also, the work-first 
orientation of PRWORA severely limits the substitution of education 
and training for work. Taken together, these program characteristics 
raise the possibility that a recipient could expend time limits without 
attaining employment or the necessary skills to obtain employment. As 
such, time limits were viewed as the key factor underlying the predicted 
demise of the social safety net. 
To underpin these concerns about time limits, there was 
research which indicated that a relatively high percentage of current 
recipients accumulated more than 60 months of welfare receipt, 
suggesting that large numbers of households would exhaust their time 
limits (Duncan, Harris and Boisjoly 1997; Pavetti 1996). Furthermore, 
a number of labor market studies suggested either: ( I )  that there would 
not be enough jobs to absorb the number of clients affected by welfare 
reform (Bernstein 1997); or (2) that even when available, most jobs 
would not pay enough to raise clients above the poverty level (Blank 
1994; Burtless 1997). An additional body of research indicated a 
significant percentage of welfare recipients possessed barriers to 
employment because of health and psychological problems, low 
educational attainment levels, and other personal characteristics 
(Hershey and Pavetti 1997; Loprest and Acs 1996). Also, while the 
federal legislation specified a maximum of 60 months of benefits, it 
permitted the states to set shorter limits, and many did so. Given the 
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novelty of time limits and the available evidence, there were fears that 
the most vulnerable recipients would be hardest hit by time limits. 
In spite ofthese early concerns that time limits would mark the 
undoing of the safety net for the least capable welfare recipients, this 
has not occurred. One reason for this lack of impact is that the large 
scale expiration oftime limits did not begin until the latter part of 2001 
because the majority of states adopted the 60 month federal time limits. 
Also, evidence shows that many clients are expending their time limits 
more slowly than expected and that some of the states with shorter time 
limits (i.e., less than 60 months) have granted benefits extensions to 
affected clients (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Furthermore, welfare 
reform coincided with a period of sustained economic expansion and 
unprecedented caseload decline. As such, many recipients left the 
caseload for employment before the expiration of their time limits. 
Although time limits have not had their predicted impact on the 
nation's caseload, survey data indicate that sanctions have affected 
relatively large numbers of welfare recipients. For example, the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that in 1998, in an 
average month, 112,700 families or about 4.5 percent of TANF 
caseloads were under a sanction (GAO 2000). Goldberg and Schott 
(2000) find that, through 1999, sanctions account for three times more 
case closures than time limits. Research also suggests that sanctions are 
having a disproportionate impact on cases with greater barriers to self- 
sufficiency. For example, Goldberg and Schott (2000) review the 
recent literature on sanction studies and find that sanctioned recipients 
typically have lower educational and work skill levels, less work 
experience, a greater prevalence of health problems, and other barriers 
such as the lack of child care and transportation. In an ongoing three 
city survey, Cherlin et al. (2001) find that sanctioned clients were more 
vulnerable than nonsanctioned TANF recipients. When compared to 
nonsanctioned recipients, the sanctioned recipients exhibited the 
following characteristics: fewer had a high school education; more had 
health problems; more experienced low monthly incomes; more 
reported food insecurity; fewer had employment experience in the prior 
two years; fewer had a telephone at home; fewer owned an automobile; 
more had used marijuana or hard drugs in the prior 12 months; more 
reported poor housing quality, and more lived in neighborhoods 
characterized by undesirable conditions such as crime and abandoned 
housing (Cherlin et al. 2001). Other research has found a high 
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correspondence between sanctions and child welfare risk (Shook 1999), 
and a strong association between being sanctioned and leaving the 
caseload (Fein and Kanveit 1997). There is also evidence that once off 
the caseload, sanctioned recipients have lower wages and fewer hours 
of employment than nonsanctioned recipients (GAO 2000). 
Consequently, it appears that sanctions removed many of the more 
vulnerable families long before they reached the end of their time 
limits. 
Earlier research has shown that, even in the absence of 
behavioral tools such as sanctions and time limits, women with higher 
endowments of human capital generally leave welfare on their own 
(O'Neill, Bassi and Wolf 1987). To the extent this is true, then it is 
likely that these already self-motivated recipients would be less likely to 
receive sanctions for noncompliance and would be more likely to exit 
the caseload before the expiration of their time limits. With the 
persistence of this type of exit selectivity, the caseload increasingly 
would consist of the least advantaged recipients, that is, those with the 
lowest levels of human capital accumulation. However, the survey 
evidence reviewed above suggests that it is these less educated 
recipients who are most prone to sanctions. Thus, the possibilityexists 
that time limits are drawing out the more advantaged recipients even as 
sanctions are pushing out the more vulnerable recipients. 
Moffitt (1999) provides the framework and rationale for 
distinguishing differential policy impacts. Two hypothetical outcomes 
can occur from reform policy. The first, which can be called the labor 
market attachment model, occurs when a work-oriented policy draws 
the more highly-skilled into employment. The second possible 
outcome is that sanctions and penalties force out those least able to 
comply with the work requirement. The latter can be called the 
sanction model. Moffitt (1999) offers some support for this kind of 
differential impact, finding that waivers had their strongest impact on 
women with less than 12 years of education. Waivers lowered the 
welfare participation rate for this group by 1.7 percent, compared to a 
0.9 percent decline for those with a high school education. However, 
Moffitt (1999) does not explicitly test the labor market attachment and 
sanction hypotheses. 
The behavioral contents of time limits and sanctions might 
explain the existence of differential policy impacts. It has been 
suggested that time limits might reduce the stigma associated with 
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welfare receipt (Swartz and Kaplan 1997). This reduction in stigma 
would occur because time limits reinforce the goal of self-sufficient 
employment and, as such, legitimize the receipt of temporary assistance 
in pursuit of this goal. It is possible, then, that sanctions might increase 
the stigma associated with welfare receipt. That is, compared to the 
initiation of time limits, the imposition of a sanction is more punitive 
and has a more negative behavioral message. As such, time limits and 
sanctions might have differential impacts because of differences in the 
perception of welfare stigma as well as differences in human capital 
characteristics. 
In spite of the lack of empirical evidence, there are differences 
in the content and implementation of time limits and sanctions that 
suggest the possibility of differential impacts. Although time limits and 
sanctions share the same broad goal of replacing welfare with work, 
these two behavioral tools operate differently and convey distinct 
messages to recipients (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Time limits place a 
cap on the receipt of cash benefits. For example, federal time limits 
specify a maximum lifetime cumulative total of 60 months of benefits 
receipt. The behavioral content of time limits is ambiguous, not aiming 
to reward or punish any particular action. Rather, time limits 
emphasize the temporary nature of public assistance, and the message 
of time limits is that welfare receipt is not a permanent entitlement. 
Consequently, time limits function proactively, seeking to guide future 
behavior away from welfare receipt and toward self-sufficient 
employment. 
Sanctions represent a monetary penalty for noncompliance with 
a particular requirement and have a more specific behavioral content 
than time limits. Under contemporary welfare reform, states use 
sanctions to enforce a variety of particular behaviors including the 
fulfillment of the employment requirement, ensuring school attendance, 
cooperation with child support collection efforts, attaining child 
immunizations, discouraging drug and alcohol abuse, and having 
clients attend parenting classes. The message of sanctions is that 
welfare receipt is conditioned upon mutual obligation, and this idea is 
reinforced through the withholding of assistance for noncompliance. In 
contrast to time limits, sanctions always are applied retroactively to 
correct past behavior. Consequently, although sanctions might not 
impose the long run financial burden of exhausted time limits, these 
penalties can produce significant short term economic distress, 
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particularly if their causes and consequences are unanticipated or not 
understood by a recipient. 
In addition to differences in the behavioral content of time 
limits and sanctions, there appear to be enforcement differences, 
suggesting that variations in bureaucratic procedures affect policy 
outcomes. Survey evidence indicates that a large percentage of 
sanctions occur for procedural reasons, such as a missed appointment, 
rather than the failure to comply with the major requirements of welfare 
reform (Cherlin et al. 2001). By contrast, in many states with short 
term time limits, extensions have been granted to clients who exceed 
the limit (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Consequently, the selective 
treatment of time limits and sanctions by administrators and 
caseworkers could exacerbate any existing differentials among recipient 
types. 
Viewed as a whole, the literature suggests that time limits and 
sanctions function differently. Though limited, the evidence indicates 
that sanctions might be having a disproportionate impact on those 
clients with lower levels of human capital endowment. To the extent 
that either time limits or sanctions are associated with the stigmatization 
of welfare receipt, the literature of rural welfare receipt suggests that 
nonmetropolitan areas would be more impacted by welfare reform 
measures than metropolitan areas. That is, research on the locational 
aspects of public assistance indicates that there is a greater stigma 
attached to welfare receipt in rural areas (Fitzgerald 1995; Hirschl and 
Rank 199 1 ;Vartanian 1999). To the extent, then, that time limits and 
sanctions differentially impact welfare caseload declines through 
stigma, we would expect to find these differences in the comparison of 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan caseloads. 
In summary, there is theoretical and empirical support for the 
idea that the two behavioral tools of welfare reform - time limits and 
sanctions - might differentially impact recipients. Also, to the extent 
that time limits and sanctions impact welfare stigma, the literature 
suggests that these welfare reform measures would impact metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas differently. However, the evidence for such 
differential impacts is suggestive rather than conclusive. Although 
cases experiencing time limits and sanctions are subsets of a much 
larger caseload, it is important to understand the caseload dynamics of 
these recipients. Time limits and sanctions are the primary tools for 
enforcing compliance with the work requirements of welfare reform. 
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Congress must decide whether to reauthorize PRWORA in 2002. 
Among other things, this will involve the consideration of whether to 
maintain the current system of time limits and sanctions. Presently, our 
knowledge of how time limits and sanctions impact the caseload 
remains limited, and this makes it difficult to identify needed policy 
changes (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). A first step is to determine whether 
and, if so, how these enforcement tools might differentially impact 
particular segments of the caseload. 
Welfare Reform In Texas 
Texas is among the 43 states that received federal waivers for the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program prior to the 
passage of PRWORA in 1996 (Rosewater 1997). After the enactment 
of federal welfare reform legislation, states had the option to administer 
TANF under the terms of their waivers. Texas chose to operate its 
TANF Program using its Achieving Change for Texans (ACT) waiver. 
Although both the federal legislation and ACT are based on the use of 
time limits and sanctions to move recipients from welfare to work, the 
Texas provisions differ in several important ways. 
One of the more significant differences between federal and 
Texas TANF policy is the treatment of time limits. PRWORA permits 
a maximum of 60 months of benefits receipt. Once the federal limits 
are exceeded, both the adults and children on the case face a lifetime 
bar on the receipt of further federally-funded cash assistance. Under 
ACT, there are three tiers oftime limits, 12,24, and 36 months, that are 
based on the educational level and work experience of recipients. If 
time limits are exceeded under ACT, the adult faces a five year freeze- 
out period but children on the case can continue to receive cash 
assistance. Although federal time limits begin with the receipt of cash 
assistance, the Texas time limits begin when a recipient is notified of an 
opening in the employment services program. Thus, although the 
Texas time limits are shorter than 60 months, the Texas time clock is 
activated by work services outreach rather than benefits receipt. This 
policy changed in October 1999 so that each subsequent month of 
benefit receipt in Texas has counted toward the federal time of 60 
months, regardless of whether the client was subject to state time limits 
(TWC 2000). 
As for sanctions, the federal law is rather broad, requiring that 
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states withhold at least a part of a case's grant for noncompliance with 
either the work or child support enforcement requirements (~herl in 'et  
al. 2001 ;Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Texas goes beyond this minimum 
by expanding the number of behavioral requirements subject to 
financial penalty. The behaviors subject to sanctions are elements of a 
personal responsibility agreement that all recipients must sign in order 
to establish eligibility for cash assistance. Although a broad base of 
behaviors are subject to sanctions, ACT does not penalize the entire 
case. Consequently, although Texas has a greater range of behaviors 
subject to penalties than many other states, the financial impact of 
sanctions ranges from a minimum of $25 to the full amount of the 
parent's recognized portion of the grant. 
Another factor affecting the use of time limits and sanctions in 
Texas is the state's exemption policy. Federal law permits the 
exemption of up to 20 percent of the TANF caseload from the 60 
month time limit. As have most states, Texas provides such 
exemptions to individuals on the basis of personal characteristics such 
as illness, incapacity, and pregnancy. However, Texas also maintains 
geographical exemptions based on economic deprivation andlor the 
lack of employment services. Geographical exemptions are granted at 
the county level. For the most part, these areas are sparsely populated, 
nonmetropolitan counties with limited employment opportunities. 
Persons that are exempted either for personal or geographic reasons are 
not subject to sanctions related to work requirements. They are, 
however, subject to sanctions based on the non-employment 
requirements of the personal responsibility agreement. Exempt 
recipients can volunteer for work services and, in doing so, will initiate 
the state's time limits. 
The review of the literature suggested that variations in the 
content and enforcement of time limits and sanctions might 
differentially impact welfare recipients. Texas exemplifies such 
variations with its heterogeneous patterns of policy administration for 
time limits and sanctions. Also, Texas is characterized by demographic 
and regional diversity, which would compound the potential for 
differential policy impacts. Therefore, to the extent that the two 
primary behavioral tools of welfare reform can have variable impacts 
on people and places, it is expected that these variations will be 
exemplified in the Texas TANF caseload. 
9
Swenson et al.: Time Limit and Sanction Effects of the Texas TANF Waiver
Published by eGrove, 2002
91 Time Limit and Sanction Effects --- Swenson et al. 
Research Design 
The primary questions addressed in this article examine time limit and 
sanction effects on the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan TANF 
caseloads in Texas. Have time limits and sanctions been applied 
uniformly across the state TANF caseload? Does lower human capital 
skills affect the likelihood that a case will be sanctioned? How has the 
imposition of time limits and sanctions affected the duration of cash 
assistance and the likelihood of exiting the caseload? Finally, what 
does this suggest for the future viability of the welfare safety net in 
Texas? 
In order to study the characteristics of the TANF caseload in 
Texas, a longitudinal file was constructed from administrative data files 
of all TANF recipients. The data were obtained by the Center for 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Research and Education from the 
Texas Department of Human Services. When completed, the 
longitudinal data set contained records for all clients who have received 
TANF during the 33 months from January 1997 through September 
1999, a period that coincides with the implementation of ACT within 
the state. The case-level longitudinal file used in the analysis of this 
report was extracted from this longitudinal client-level database. The 
variables used in the analysis include demographic and household 
controls and programmatic variables that are expected to affect welfare 
spells and the likelihood of incurring a sanction. We first define the 
variables used in the statistical analysis and then discuss the 
methodology. 
Demographic and Household Characteristics 
Age and racelethnicity are two demographic control variables 
examined. Age is measured as the case head's age at the beginning of 
the spell and is used as a continuous variable in the event history 
models. The racelethnicity of the household head is a category variable 
divided into five categories: Anglo, Black, Hispanic, American Indian, 
and Asian. 
Human capital characteristics such as education level and work 
experience are examined using the ACT assigned tier level. When 
notified ofthe availability ofemployment services, the client is limited 
to 12, 24, or 36 months of cash assistance depending on the tier 
10
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 18 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
92 Southern Rural Sociology, Vol18., No. 1, 2002 
classification. Tier 1 clients classified in the 12 month tier have a high 
school diploma or have worked 18 or more of the previous 24 months. 
Tier 2 clients in the 24 month tier have completed the 1 lth grade or 
have worked 6 to 17 months of the previous 24 months. All other 
clients with less education and lower work experience levels are limited 
to 36 months and are classified in the third tier. In the analysis, we 
examine these effects as categorical variables. 
Household characteristics examined are family characteristics, 
medical incapacity, and metropolitan status. Family characteristics are 
age of youngest child, number of children, and the number of adults 
certified on the case. The age of the youngest child is coded in 
categorical form to distinguish those cases with a certified child who is 
under five years of age from those with children of older ages. The 
number of children and the number of adults is the number considered 
in the TANF benefit calculation. Physical incapacity is measured as a 
physical or medical incapacity of the case head or another adult or a 
child within the household that requires the case head to attend to their 
needs. Metropolitan status is determined using the standard 
classification of Texas counties based on the Census Bureau's 1992 
classification of metropolitan areas. Texas has 58 metropolitan 
counties and 196 nonmetropolitan counties. The metropolitan status of 
a case is based on the county of residence for the family. 
TANF Case Characteristics 
Programmatic variables examined include the percentage of cases that 
have been notified that their TANF benefit clock has started, a control 
variable for the 87 counties targeted in Texas's welfare reform, and 
penalty sanctions. Under the Texas TANF waiver, ACT allowed 
flexibility in the imposition of time-limits for a case that is conditioned 
on the availability ofjobs as well as employment services to assist the 
client. Thus, time-limited cash assistance does not begin until the client 
receives notification of the availability of employment services for 
assistance. As such, each county caseload will have different 
proportions of the caseload that have began time-limited assistance in 
the post-reform period. 
Another important programmatic variable that is comparable to 
the state waiver categorical measure used in other studies (e.g., Blank 
2001) is the implementation stages of ACT. Initially, mandatory work 
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was required of approximately 90 percent of the state caseload that 
resided in 87 of Texas's 254 counties. These counties were targeted to 
lead the implementation of employment assistance programs and were 
dispersed across the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas of the 
state. All 27 metropolitan central city counties were included in the 
original 87 counties. The rest of the original implementation counties 
include 83.9 percent of the metropolitan suburban, 19.0 percent of the 
nonmetropolitan adjacent, and 14.7 percent of the nonmetropolitan 
non-adjacent counties. The other 167 counties contained less than10 
percent of the total state caseload and were classified as minimal 
service and geographically exempt counties during the period examined 
in this research. 
The final programmatic variables examined are the sanction 
penalties within the state. There are eight different types of penalties 
under ACT with varying sanction amounts and duration (TWC 1999). 
Seven types of penalty sanctions may affect a case regardless of 
participation in the CHOICES program, while the eighth type only 
affects those cases that have begun the state time limits and increases in 
severity for each violation of the CHOICES program. The sanctions 
outside of the CHOICES program participation cover a broad range of 
behaviors such as children's school attendance, childhood 
immunizations, medical and dental checkups, child support and 
paternity establishment, parenting classes, and controlled substance and 
alcohol abuse. In the sanction model, the dependent variable is the 
duration until any of the eight types of sanctions. In the spell duration 
model, the sanction variable is a categorical variable indicating a 
penalty for any of the eight types. 
Methodology 
The analysis was completed using basic descriptive statistics and event 
history analysis techniques. The descriptive analysis is based on the 
full monthly caseload where the case has at least one certified adult. 
This excludes child-only cases because they are exempt from many of 
the welfare reform measures. For TANF-UP (Unemployed Parent) 
cases, the characteristics of the parent designated as the case head are 
used. The statistical analysis consists of two different event history 
models examining the duration until a case receives its first sanction 
and the duration until the case exits the TANF caseload. 
12
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Event history analysis is the study of the probability of events 
occurring at particular points in time (Allison 1995). Since we have 
independent variables that change over time, also known as time- 
dependent covariates, we use the proportional hazard model or Cox 
regression for semiparametric models. To estimate this model, the 
PROC PHREG in SAS was used with ties handled using the Breslow 
method (Allison 1995). Using this method, we examine the effect that 
the independent variables have on the hazard that a case will receive its 
first sanction or exit the caseload. Duration spells are measured in 
months. The event history models examine only the first spell ofthose 
cases that enter the caseload from January 1997 through September 
1999. For the TANF spell duration model, cases are right censored if 
they remain on the TANF caseload in October 1999, and the variables 
in the model are fixed at their initial status values except for state time 
limits and penalty sanctions, which covary with time. For the sanction 
model, cases are right censored if they remain on the TANF caseload in 
October 1999 or exit without any penalty sanctions, and state time 
limits covaries with time while all other model variables are fixed at 
initial status. 
Using event history analysis with time-dependent covariates, 
the proportional hazard rate at time, t, depends on the values of the 
independent variables at the same time, t. Thus, when we interpret 
results from the event history model we discuss the increasing or 
decreasing effects the independent variables have on the proportional 
hazard rate. An understandable way to interpret the coefficients in 
event history analysis is to examine the risk ratio (Allison 1995). The 
risk ratio is calculated as the exponential of the parameter value. By 
using the formula 100*(risk ratio-1), we can discuss the effect of unit 
changes in the independent variable in relation to percent changes in 
the proportional hazard rate (Allison 1995). In other words, using the 
risk ratio calculation, the results of the event history models can be 
discussed in terms of unit changes in the independent variable and the 
corresponding percentage change in the likelihood that a case will be 
sanctioned or exit the caseload. 
Findings 
During the period of ACT, there was a 56.1 percent decline in the met- 
ropolitan caseload and a 4 1.4 percent decline in the nonmetropolitan 
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caseload. Overall, the total state TANF caseload had a 53.5 percent 
decline in the number of cases with at least one certified adult. The 
substantial decline from January 1997 to September 1999 is evident in 
both urban and rural areas in Texas, but the slower decline rate in rural 
areas has resulted in an increase in the overall proportion of the state 
caseload that resides in rural counties. The proportion of the state 
TANF caseload that resides in nonmetropolitan areas in Texas 
increased from 17.2 percent in January 1997 to 21.7 percent in 
September 1999. Although rural areas have had a substantial decline, it 
has not kept pace with the decline rate in urban areas. The discussion 
proceeds by describing the rate of implementation of sanctions and state 
time limits within metropolitan and nonrnetropolitan areas of the state 
and is followed by results of the event history models. 
Sanction and Time Limit Patterns 
The rate of implementation of the state's time-limited benefits varied 
considerably between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. As 
shown in Figure 1, beginning in January 1998 and continuing through 
September 1999, the gap between urban and rural cases with time 
limits is more than 40 percent. The continuation of this gap is such that 
in September 1999 the metropolitan caseload has 72.1 percent of its 
caseload on the state's time limited benefits while the nonrnetropolitan 
caseload has 30.1 percent. This is a net difference of 42.0 percent 
between urban and rural areas in the proportions of the caseload 
receiving any job assistance services. This suggests that the provision 
of services to assist in the transition from welfare to work varies 
depending on where a client resides within the state with more services 
available to a larger proportion of the metropolitan caseload. 
In comparison, however, the rate at which the caseload is 
subject to sanction penalties is relatively similar between the two area 
caseloads. As shown in Figure 2, the gap between metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan areas is less than 10 percent during the entire period. 
Considering the substantial gap between the caseload proportions 
receiving job services, this relatively small gap in the sanctioning rate 
suggests that sanctions are being applied more evenly in metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
sanctions are being applied uniformly across the state caseload while 
state time limits and job assistance have more locational variation. 
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Figure 1: Percent  of TANF Caseload with State Time LimitslJob Assistance 
k t a t e  - o f  Texas IHMetropolitan Counties l ~ o n m e t r o p o ~ ~  
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic Research and Education, Department of 
Rural Sociology, Texas A&M University. 
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F igure  2: Pe rcen t  o f  TANF  Case load  wi th  Penal ty  Sanct ion 
1 197 4 / 97  7 / 97  10197 1 / 9 8  4 / 98  7 / 98  10198 1 / 99  4 / 99  7 / 9 9  9 / 9 9  
-of Texas  WMetropol i tan Count ies l N o nme t r o p o l i t a n  Coun t ies  1 
Source: Unpublished data at Center for ~ e r n o k a ~ h i c  and Socioeconomic Research and Education, Department of 
Rural Sociology, Texas A&M University. 
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Duration until Filst Sanction 
In first column of Table 1, the results of the Cox regression on the 
duration until a case's first penalty sanction for the State of Texas are 
presented. The findings suggest that the likelihood of a case receiving a 
sanction increases if a case has lower human capital, has begun state 
time-limited benefits, resides in one of the original 87 counties, or 
resides in a nonmetropolitan county. Cases that are classified in the 
second educationlwork tier are 12.6 percent more likely to receive a 
sanction than cases in the first tier, and cases in the third tier are 23.7 
percent more likely. These findings suggest that recipients with lower 
education levels and work experience may be more likely to 
misunderstand the "new rules" surrounding welfare reform and to be 
penalized with monetary sanctions. Furthermore, cases in 
nonmetropolitan counties are 7.7 percent more likely to receive a 
sanction than metropolitan cases. 
Table 2 examines the results for the sanction models for 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas as separate models. In 
metropolitan areas, cases in the second tier are 12.0 percent and cases 
in the third tier are 2 1.9 percent more likely to receive a sanction than 
cases in the first tier. In nonmetropolitan areas, cases in the second and 
third tiers have a greater disadvantage than the first tier with a 20.0 
percent increase for the second tier and a 38.9 percent increase for the 
third tier. As such, sanctions have been applied disproportionately to 
those with lower levels of human capital, and this selectivity is more 
apparent in nonmetropolitan areas. Thus, for those in rural areas 
possessing lower human capital skills is an even greater disadvantage. 
TANF Spell Duration 
The first column in Table 3 presents the proportional hazard model of 
the TANF spell duration for the State of Texas. Beginning the state 
time limited benefits increases the likelihood of exiting by 8.7 percent. 
Receiving a sanction increases the likelihood of exiting by 22.4 percent. 
This suggests that sanctions have a greater impact on the spell duration 
than the state time limited benefits and the provision of job services. 
Not surprisingly, cases classified in the second and third tiers have 
longer expected durations than cases in the first tier. Residing in one of 
the original 87 counties increases the likelihood of exiting by 7.8 
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Table 1: Proportional Hazard Model of Duration until First 
Penalty Sanction for TANF Cases Beginning New Spell from 
January 1997 to September 1999 for the State of Texas. 
7 1 Parameter 1 Standard 1 Risk 1 
Estimate 
State Time Limits 1.0906** (0.01 1 1) 2.976 
EducatiodWork Tier 2 
1 0.1 184** 1 (0.0090)1 4
EducatiodWork Tier 3 
1 0.2125** (0.0079) 
Child Under Age 5 - 1 . 2 9 7 ~ - ~ 0 =  
Second Adult -0.2627*
* 
-0.7691. , , ,  
(0.0092)
L - 1% 
r a n i '  
-- ' (0.0092) 0.968p::iii:l

American Indian (0.0634) 1.046 
Asian -0.2996** (0.0471) 0.741 
-- 7
Medical I capacity - l . O 8 0 * *  (0.017'7) 

The 87 Counties 0 . 4 9 3 9 * *  (0.0203) 1.639 

Nonmetropolitan County 
I 0.0740** @O 126) 1.077' 

Likelihood Ratio 60,024.98** 

Score 54,770.21** 

Wald 47,681.47** 

Total Number of Cases 374,604 

Censored Percentage 75.89 

Average Spell Duration 5.12 

Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.0001 
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic Research 
and Education, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A& M University. 
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Table 2: Proportional Hazard Model of Duration until First Penalty Sanction for TANF Cases Beginning New 
Spell from January 1997 to September 1999 for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Counties in the State of Texas. 
Inde~endent Variable 
State Time Limits 
EducatiodWork Tier 2 
EducatiodWork Tier 3 
Age 
Number of Children 
Child Under Age 5 
Second Adult 
Black 
Hispanic 
American Indian 
Asian 
Medical Incapacity 
The 87 Counties 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
Total Number of Cases 
Censored Percentage 
Average Spell Duration 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Metropolitan Counties 
1.0509** 
0.1129** 
0.1981** 
-0.0145** 
0.0736** 
-1.3695** 
-0.2076** 
0.1051** 
-0.0591**  
-0.0496 
-0.3326** 
-1.2137** 
0.5825** 
48,377.64** 
44,010.31** 
37,878.98** 
302,25 1 
73.77 
5.05 
Standard 

Error 

(0.0121) 
(0.0096) 
(0.0084) 
(0.0005) 
(0.003 1) 
(0.0095) 
(0.0 157) 
(0.0099) 
(0.0101) 
(0.0713) 
(0.0477) 
(0.0 199) 
(0.0752) 
Risk 

Ratio 

2.860 
1.120 
1.219 
0.986 
1.076 
0.254 
0.813 
1.111 
0.943 
0.952 
0.717 
0.297 
1.79 1 
1 

19
Swenson et al.: Time Limit and Sanction Effects of the Texas TANF Waiver
Published by eGrove, 2002
Parameter Standard Risk 
l~nde~endent  Estimate RatioVariable Error 
Nonmetropolitan Counties 
State Time Limits 1.2083** (0.0263) 3.348-
EducatiodWork Tier 2 0.1822** (0.0264) 1.200 
EducatiodWork Tier 3 0.3285** (0.0222) 1.389 
Age -0.0307** (0.001 3) 0.970 
Number of Children 0.0856** (0.0086) 1.089 
Child Under Age 5 -0.8532** (0.0230) 0.426 
Second Adult -0.5068** 1 (0.0344) 0.602 
Black 0.1709** (0.0252) 1.186 
Hispanic 0.0824* (0.023 1) 1.086 
American Indian 0.3712* (0.1387) 1.449 
Asian -0.1335 (0.3338) 0.875 
Medical Incapacity -0.4623** (0.0391) 0.630 
The 87 Counties 0.3626** (0.0258) 1.437 
Likelihood Ratio 8,85 1.20** 
Score 9,729.37** 
Wald 8,445.14** 'Total Number of Cases 72,353 
ICensored Percentage 84.72 A v e r a g e e l l  Duration 5.41 
Notes: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.0001 
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic Research and Education, Department of Rural 
Sociology, Texas A&M University. 
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percent. Cases in nonmetropolitan areas are 1.2 percent less likely to 
exit than cases in metropolitan areas, holding all other variables 
constant. These findings suggest that time limits and sanctions as well 
as higher human capital skills increase the likelihood of exiting TANF. 
Separate models for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas 
are listed in Table 4. In metropolitan areas, cases with time-limited 
benefits are 7.0 percent more likely to exit. Sanction penalties for the 
metropolitan caseload have a 2 1.6 percent increase in the likelihood of 
exiting the caseload. Sanction penalties for the nonmetropolitan 
caseload have a 23.2 percent increase in the likelihood of exiting the 
caseload. In nonmetropolitan areas, starting time-limited benefits 
increases the likelihood of exiting 12.8 percent. These comparative 
findings suggest that having state time-limited benefits and job-related 
sanctions increase the likelihood of exiting the nonmetropolitan more 
than the metropolitan caseload. Thus, the provision of job services 
assists in moving cases off of welfare more quickly than those cases not 
provided these services for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
caseloads. However, even though rural recipients are less likely to exit 
overall, time limits and job-related sanctions are associated with greater 
exit probabilities in the nonmetropolitan caseload. To the extent that 
rural areas have less economic opportunity than urban areas, these 
greater exit probabilities may be due to differences in the perception of 
stigma. 
Conclusions 
The defining nature of a fixed block grant for TANF benefits allows 
states many benefits as well as constraints. The foremost benefit is the 
flexibility to be able to concentrate resources more efficiently and 
effectively in areas with the greatest need. For example, targeted work 
programs were initially implemented in 87 of the 254 counties in Texas 
and provided assistance in counties that comprised approximately 90 
percent of the total welfare caseload in the state. The resulting 
constraints of a fixed block grant are the tradeoffs that are inherent with 
business cycle fluctuations and with administrative overhead costs of 
expanded service provisions. For example, during an economic 
downturn, the number of families needing assistance could potentially 
increase at the same time that the demand or need for additional job 
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Table 3: Proportional Hazard Model of TANF Spell 
Duration for Cases Beginning New Spell from January 
1997 to September 1999 for the State of Texas. 
, r v P a r a m e t e r ~ t a n d a r d1 Risk 11 1Estimate Error Ratio 
I State Time Limits 0.0837** I (0.0041) 1.087 
i ~ena l t vsanction 1 0.2021** 1 (0.0049) 1 1.224 1 
EducatiodWork Tier 2 -0.0732.. (0.0048) 1 0.929 
EducatiodWork Tier 3 h 6 3 2 * * + 4 4 )  0.7691 
h x i r  of Children 7 0.0025 1 ( 0 . 0 0 m  
ch i ld  Under Age 5 
-0.1 179** (0.0041) 0.8891 1 '1 
Second Adult 0.2974** (0.0060) 1.346 
Black -0.1608** I (m 
Nonmetropolitan County 
14,185.79**1 score 13,994.17** 1 
~ o t a lNumber of Cases 374,604 11 censored Percentage 
Average Spell Duration 
Notes: * p < 0.05; **p< 0.0001 
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic 
Research and Education, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A&M 
University. 
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Table 4: Proportional Hazard Model of TANF Spell Duration for Cases Beginning New Spell from January 
1997 to September 1999 for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Counties in the State of Texas 
Independent Variable 
State Time Limits 
Penalty Sanction 
EducatiodWork Tier 2 
EducatiodWork Tier 3 
Age 
Number of Children 
Child Under Age 5 
Second Adult 
Black 
Hispanic 
American Indian 
Asian 
Medical Incapacity 
The 87 Counties 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
Total Number of Cases 
Censored Percentage 
Average S ~ e l l  Duration 
Parameter StandardA Error 
Metropolitan Counties 
0.0679** 
0.1954** 
-0.0816** 
-0.0057** 
1 0.3425** 
-0.1628** 
-0.1055** 
-0.0265 
0.0467* 
-0.4487** 
0.1474** 
12,512.66** 
(0.0046) 
(0.0053) 
(0.0053) 
(0.0071) 
(0.0054) 
(0.0053) 
(0.0368) 
(0.021 1) 
(0.0086) 
(0.0081) 
Risk 

Ratio 

1.070 
1.216 
0.922 
1.408 
0.850 
0.900 
0.974 
1.048 
0.638 
1.159 
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Parameter Standard Risk 
Independent Variable Estimate Error Ratio 
Nonmetropolitan Counties 
State Time Limits 
Penalty Sanction 
EducatiodWork Tier 2 
EducatiodWork Tier 3 
Age 
Number of Children 
Child Under Age 5 
Second Adult 
Black 
Hispanic 
American Indian 
Asian 
Medical Incapacity 
The 87 Counties 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
Total Number of Cases 
Censored Percentage 
Average Spell Duration 
Notes: * p < 0.05; * *  p< 0.0001 
0.1209** 
0.2086** 
-0.0352* 
-0.2227** 
-0.0067** 
0.0121* 
-0.0972** 
0.1954** 
-0.1578** 
-0.0606** 
0.0659 
-0.071 3 
-0.3330** 
-0.0246* 
2,025.80** 
1,998.01** 
1,990.02** 
72,353 
16.61 
6.01 
(0.0097) 1.129 
(0.0137) 1.232 
(0.01 11) 0.965 
(0.0100) 0.800 
(0.0005) 0.993 
(0.0038) 1.012 
(0.0093) 0.907 
(0.0110) 1.216 
(0.01 18) 0.854 
(0.0096) 0.94 1 
(0.0688) 1.068 
(0.1326) 0.93 1 
(0.0166) 0.717 
(0.0 102) 0.976 
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic 
Research and Education, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A&M University. 
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assistance services by existingcaseload recipients would be increasing. 
During the period examined in this research, Texas operated its 
TANF program under its federal waiver. The differences in the 
implementation of reform measures in metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan areas resulted in a relatively uniform application of its 
sanction penalties but a large difference in the provision ofjob services. 
The disparity in the proportions of the caseloads in September 1999 
receiving job assistance suggest that many families are leaving the 
TANF caseload in rural areas without any job preparation services that 
are available to clients in urban areas of the state. The consequence of 
this disparity was mitigated by the geographic exemption from state 
time limits for those families in the more remote areas of the state 
during this period. 
Empirically, families in nonmetropolitan areas are more likely 
to be sanctioned and have longer spell durations, although these 
differences from urban areas are relatively small compared to the other 
independent effects. In the models examining the urban and rural 
caseloads separately, the effects of lower human capital skills increased 
the likelihood of being sanctioned at a faster rate in the nonmetropolitan 
caseload. Taken together, these findings for the state caseload suggest 
support for Moffitt's (1999) dual process caseload decline; cases with 
higher human capital skills as well as cases with time limits and 
sanctions are more likely to exit the caseload at faster rates. 
In October 1999, Texas reauthorized its sanction policy but 
began running the federal time clock concurrently with the state's 
variable time limits. This began a hybrid system of the state and federal 
requirements where time limited benefits accrued with monthlyreceipt 
rather than the provision of work assistance. With the imposition of 
federal time limits in October 1999, this suggests that many families in 
rural areas will accumulate months on their lifetime federal time clock 
without any job assistance or training programs available to assist them 
in their transition from welfare. While Texas has begun to extend 
services to counties initially classified as minimal service counties with 
Rural Initiatives grants (THHSC 200 l), many of these programs have 
yet to be implemented or even initiated, which means that many 
families in rural areas may have over 24 months used on their federal 
time clock before any employment assistance programs reach their 
areas. 
In 1996 when PRWORA was signed, many pundits predicted a 
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"race to the bottom" among the states as they adhere to many of the 
federal reform measures, such as the caseload reduction credit. By all 
accounts, many of these dire warnings have not manifested. 
Nonetheless, many states, such as Texas, have made substantial 
tradeoffs in the service delivery models within the state, which results 
in locational differences in the types of available services. As the 
descriptive findings have shown, there is over a 40 percent gap between 
urban and rural areas in the caseload proportions that began Texas' state 
time limits and received any job assistance. In contrast, the sanctioning 
policies were applied relatively uniformly across the state. These 
locational differences between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas 
suggest the potential for a rural disadvantage where families are 
penalized for not abiding by the rules but provided little to no 
assistance in the transition off of the welfare rolls. 
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